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NOTES
Criminal Procedure: Godfrey v. Georgia and the
"Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel" Murder
When Oklahoma's current death penalty statutes were enacted in 1976,'
a similar statutory plan had already withstood facial challenge on constitu-
tional grounds in Gregg v. Georgia.2
Sections 701.9-701.13 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, like the
Georgia statutes3 that were reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg, provide for a bifurcated trial, 4 the finding of at least one of the
statutorily specified aggravating circumstances,s and automatic review by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in all capital punishment cases. 6
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court reexamined the
Georgia statutes,' scrutinizing the factual situation in which one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances becomes applicable to a murder.
The purpose of this note is to examine in particular the aggravating cir-
cumstance found at section 701.12(4) of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
"that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," in light of
Godfrey v. Georgia.'
To accomplish that goal, it will be necessary to examine first the
statutory aggravating circumstance 9 at issue in Godfrey, and to compare that
statute to Oklahoma's comparable section 701.12(4). Then, following a fuller
analysis of Godfrey, the implications of that case for Oklahoma will be
discussed in light of two recent Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals deci-
sions construing section 701.12(4), 10 Chaney v. State" and Eddings v. State.'
2
121 OKLA. STAT. §§ 701.9-701.15 (Supp. 1980).
2 428 U.S. 153, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
1 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902, 26-2001, 26-3301 (1972) define the
crimes for which the death penalty may be imposed; § 27-2503 provides for a bifurcated trial; §
27-2534.1(b) enumerates ten aggravating circumstances, at least one of which must be found and
specified if death is imposed, according to § 26-3102; § 27-2537 provides for direct review by the
Georgia Supreme Court if death is imposed; § 27-2537(e) requires that if the sentence is affirmed,
the court must include in its decision reference to similar cases that have been considered.
4 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10 (Supp. 1980).
1 21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 701.11, 701.12 (Supp. 1980).
621 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13 (Supp. 1980).
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7). Section 27-2534.1 of the Georgia Code Annotated
provides: "(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the
judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any
mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of
the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: ....
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery
to the victim."
0 Section 701.12 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes specifies, "Aggravating cir-
cumstances shall be: ... 4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."
612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
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Comparison of the Oklahoma and the Georgia Statutes
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia," the
Georgia Supreme Court had affirmed two death sentences 4 when the only
statutory aggravating circumstance found by the jury was that of subsection
(b)(7). 5 One of those cases involved "a horrifying torture-murder," while
the other was of "similar ilk."' 6 In response to defendant Gregg's argument
that this aggravating circumstance was so broad that capital punishment
could be imposed for almost any murder, the Supreme Court responded: "It
is, of cour;e, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and
there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt
such an open-ended construction."'
7
By the time of the Supreme Court's review of Godfrey's conviction,
which was also based wholly on subsection (b)(7), the Court found that the
Georgia Supreme Court had indeed adopted such a "limiting construction"
of subsection (b)(7),8 and that failure to follow this limitation in imposing a
death sentence in Godfrey's case constituted precisely the "standardless and
unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a
basically uninstructed jury"'19 prohibited earlier in Furman v. Georgia.20
Although the phraseology of Georgia's subsection (b)(7) differs facially
from Oklahoma's section 701.12(4),21 judicial construction of the respective
statutes indicates that they are clearly parallel, and for that reason, the deci-
sion in Goafrey deserves close attention by the Oklahoma courts.
22
In an opinion issued subsequent to Gregg,21 the Georgia Supreme Court
" 428 U.S. 153, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
" McQuordale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974); House v. State, 232 Ga.
140, 205 S.E.2d 217 (1974).
See note 9, supra, for express language of the statute.
6 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980). The Supreme Court stated in Godfrey that the two cases
cited in note 14, supra, had been decided prior to the Gregg decision; the Gregg case indicates
that only one case, McQuordale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 377 (1974), had been decided
at that time. Both McQuordale and House v. State, 232 Ga. 140, 205 S.E.2d 217 (1974), were
decided in 1974, while the Gregg decision came in 1976.
27 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976).
' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980).
19 Id.
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (imposition and carrying out of the death penalty under state
statutes which authorize imposing such a sentence in the unguided discretion of the jury con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments).
22 See notes 9-10, supra, for text of the respective statutes.
212 As noted in Gregg, the new statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be
found before a death sentence can be imposed, direct the jury's attention to the specific cir-
cumstances of the crime committed. Each factor named in the statute requires the jury to answer
a question, and the test for applying the seventh aggravating circumstance found in subsection
(b) is, "Was it [the murder] committed in a particularly heinous way .... 7" 428 U.S. 153, 201
(1976). The comparable Oklahoma test is, "Was the murder especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel?"




indicated that subsection (b)(7) involves two factors-the effect on the vic-
tim, i.e., of torture or aggravated battery, and the offender's depravity of
mind. As to both factors, "the test is that the acts were outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman."2,
The Georgia jury that sentenced Godfrey to death used this same
language in specifying the aggravating circumstance that they had found to
exist in the murders for which they had previously convicted Godfrey. On ap-
peal, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected Godfrey's contention that this
phraseology of subsection (b)(7) was an inadequate statement of the
statutorily specified aggravating circumstance.2"
Finally, in Godfrey the Supreme Court found that the Georgia Supreme
Court had reached three "separate but consistent" conclusions regarding this
particular aggravating circumstance: (1) the evidence that the offense fell into
this aggravating circumstance had to demonstrate torture, depravity of mind,
or an aggravated battery to the victim; (2) "depravity of mind" comprehends
only the kind of mental state that leads the murderer to torture or to commit
an aggravated battery before killing the victim; (3) the word "torture" must
be construed in pari materia with "aggravated battery," resulting in a re-
quirement of serious physical abuse of the victim before death.
26
In effect, then, Georgia's subsection (b)(7) sets forth an aggravating cir-
cumstance justifying the death penalty only when the acts culminating in the
homicide were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," 7 and
such acts are those which result in "serious physical abuse of the victim
before death." 2
The test for application of Georgia's subsection (b)(7) promulgated in
Harris v. State29 bears close resemblance to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals' current construction of section 701.12(4) of Title 21.
In Eddings v. State,3" the court rejected the defendant's contention that
the murder to which he entered a plea of nolo contendere was no more
heinous, atrocious, or cruel than every murder and quoted the Florida
Supreme Court's 3 definition of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" 32:
[H]einous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; . .
atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; ... cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoy-
24 Id., 230 S.E.2d at 10-11 (emphasis added). See also Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 299,
236 S.E.2d 637, 643 (1977) ("the depravity of mind contemplated by the statute is that which
results in torture or aggravated battery to the victim.").
25 Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 310, 253 S.E.2d 710, 718 (1979).
26 446 U.S. 420, 431 (1980).
27 See text accompanying note 24, supra.
2s See text accompanying note 26, supra.
29 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (1976).
10 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
11 State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
22 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1979) specifies an aggravating circumstance justifying
imposition of the death penalty that is identical to 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.12(4) (Supp. 1976).
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ment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be included are
those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony
was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from
the norm of capital felonies-the conscienceless or pitiless crime which
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
3
Additionally, in Chaney v. State,34 the court approved trial court in-
structions that defined section 701.12(4) with substantially similar wording."
In rejecting the defendant's assertion that all murders are especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel, the court noted, "the manner of death in one case may
certainly be distinguishable from another in the degree of atrocity or
cruelty." 3 6
Like Georgia, Oklahoma seems to have construed this particular ag-
gravating circumstance to mean that a murder is especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel when the manner of causing death is outrageously wicked or vile.
The definitions adopted in Chaney and Eddings indicate that such acts are
those intended to result in torture of the victim or the infliction of "a high
degree" of pain. As an analysis of Godfrey shows, the Supreme Court has
restricted application of such an aggravating circumstance to cases in which
the victim was physically abused prior to death. As the fact situations in
Chaney and Eddings show, however, Oklahoma has not so restricted the ap-
plication of our fourth statutory aggravating circumstance. The strong
parallel between this Oklahoma aggravating factor (that the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel) and the Georgia statute construed in
Godfrey makes the Godfrey decision significant for Oklahoma.
Godfrey v. Georgia
Defendant Godfrey was accused of the shotgun murders of his wife and
her mother. In September of 1977, after an argument in which the defendant
had threatened her with a knife, Mrs. Godfrey and the couple's 11-year-old
daughter moved in with Godfrey's mother-in-law, who lived only a short
distance from the Godfrey house. Mrs. Godfrey filed for a divorce, but the
arguments between her and the defendant continued to occur frequently,
conducted by telephone. On September 20, after two such telephone calls,
Godfrey got out his shotgun, walked down the hill to his mother-in-law's
house trailer, aimed the shotgun through the window of the trailer, and shot
his wife in the forehead, killing her instantly. He then entered the trailer,
striking his daughter with the butt of the gun as she fled, and shot his
mother-in-law in the head; she also died instantly. Godfrey then called the
11 616 P.2d 1159, 1167-68 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
11 612 FP.2d 269 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
" The trial court in Chaney instructed the jury that "heinous" means "extremely wicked
or shockingly evil," "atrocious" is "outrageously wicked and vile," and "cruel" is defined as
"designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of





local sheriff's office, explained what had happened, and asked for the sheriff
to "come and pick him up.")
37
He sat down in a chair in open view of the driveway to wait for the
officers, and upon their arrival he showed them where he had put the
shotgun. Later he said, "I've done a hideous crime . . . but I have been
thinking about it for eight years.... I'd do it again.""8 Upon trial, he was
convicted of two counts of murder and one count of aggravated assault. The
jury returned death sentences as to each murder conviction, stating that they
had found as an aggravating circumstance in both murders that the offense
was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." 39
This application of subsection (b)(7) presents a significant contrast to
Georgia's prior construction of that aggravating circumstance. As the
Supreme Court noted in Godfrey, "Three times during the course of his
argument the prosecutor stated that the case involved no allegation of 'tor-
ture' or of an 'aggravated battery.' ,,,0 Additionally, in a questionnaire re-
quired in all capital cases,'41 the trial judge answered a question inquiring
whether the victims had been physically harmed or tortured, "No, as to both
victims, excluding the actual murdering of the two victims." '42 The Georgia
Supreme Court, however, affirmed Godfrey's conviction and the imposition
of the death penalty, stating simply that the evidence supported the jury's
finding of the subsection (b)(7) aggravating circumstance in both murders.'
3
In reviewing Godfrey's sentence, the Supreme Court noted the limiting
criteria previously established by the Georgia Supreme Court for application
of the subsection (b)(7) aggravating circumstance. The opinions in Harris v.
State" and Blake v. State"' suggested to the Supreme Court that the narrow-
ing construction Georgia had adopted amounted, quite simply, to a require-
ment of evidence that the victim had been seriously physically abused prior to
death. 46 Such a conclusion was manifested in the three-prong test that had
evolved: (1) for this circumstance to apply, there must be evidence of torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim; (2) depravity of
mind is the mental state that leads to torture or aggravated battery before the
victim is killed; (3) torture and aggravated battery must be construed
together, imposing a requirement for evidence that the victim was seriously
physically abused prior to death.
47
In Godfrey, the Court concluded that the previously established criteria
31 446 U.S. 420, 424, 425 (1980).
38 Id. at 425, 426.
"1 Id. at 426.
40 Id.
'' GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a) (Supp. 1975).
,2 446 U.S. 420, 426 (1980).
41 243 Ga. 302, 309-11, 253 S.E.2d 710, 717-18 (1979).
" 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1 (1976).
" 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (1977).
,6 446 U.S. 420, 431 (1980).
' Id.
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were not followed, and the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to meet the
standards it had laid out for itself. 8 As expressly indicated by both the pro-
secutor in his opening remarks and by the trial court in its sentencing
report,49 the murder did not involve torture. Furthermore, no claim was ever
made that the defendant had committed an aggravated battery upon either
victim, "or, in fact, caused either of them to suffer any physical injury
preceding their deaths.""0 In light of all these facts, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Georgia court could not be said to have applied a constitu-
tional construction of the phrase "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that [they] involved.., depravity of mind.... .'"" In support of
that conclusion the Court reiterated, "The petitioner's crimes cannot be said
to have reflected a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any
person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously.""
Significantly, the Court noted that in light of the fact that the victims did die
instantly, "it is constitutionally irrelevant that the petitioner used a shotgun
instead of a rifle as the murder weapon, resulting in a gruesome spectacle in
his mother-in-law's trailer. An interpretation of section (b)(7) so as to include
all murders resulting in gruesome scenes would be totally irrational."3
This conclusion, and the reasoning supporting it, is significant to a
comparison of the factual situations under which the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals has affirmed findings thaf a murder is "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel." 54
Chaney v. State
Larry Leon Chaney was convicted of first-degree murder in the death
of Mrs. Kendal Inez Ashmore. Mrs. Ashmore and her assistant, Kathy
Brown, had made a business appointment with a man whom neither woman
knew for March 17, 1977. The women's bodies were found buried in a
shallow grave on the defendant's property on March 22, 1977."
The jury found four aggravating circumstances present before assessing
the death penalty: (1) the defendant had in fact created a great risk of death
to more than one person in that he did in fact kill two persons, Mrs. Kendal
Inez Ashmore and Kathy Ann Brown; (2) he committed the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration in that he killed the two
women while attempting to extort $500,000 from the Ashmore family; (3) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; (4) the murder was com-
Id. at 432.
Id. at 426.
So Id. at 432.
" Id.
52 Id. at 433.
Id. at n.16 (emphasis added).
' 21 Oi',A. STAT. § 701.12(4) (Supp. 1980).
" Chancy was tried in this case only for the murder of Mrs. Ashmore. In separate cases
he was charged with the murder of Ms. Brown and with the kidnapping of both women. 612




mitted for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecu-
tion. "
The opinion in Chaney gives minimal details with respect to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the murder for which the defendant was convicted.
The bodies were discovered under a large pile of brush;" the state introduced
into evidence strips of toweling, found on the bodies, which were used to
bind and strangle the victims; 8 and the state proceeded on the theory that the
victims were both killed shortly after their abduction on March 17.9
On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury was not given any
guidance during the sentencing stage of the trial in its evaluation of the
aggravating and mitigating factors." In particular, the defendant attacked
the fourth aggravating circumstance listed in section 701.12, that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
noting that "the manner of death in one case may certainly be distinguish-
able from another in the degree of atrocity or cruelty," ' 6' approved the
definition of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" given by the trial
court: "heinous" means "extremely wicked or shockingly evil," "atrocious"
is "outrageously wicked and vile," and "cruel" is defined as "designed to
inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the suf-
fering of others, pitiless."
62
The facts that distinguished this case, however, are alluded to only in
the final paragraphs of the opinion:
We are of the opinion that this case is one of the most heinous and
cruel cases considered by this Court. The manner in which the women
were killed, coupled with the demand for ransom and the manner in
which the bodies were disposed of, justifies the imposition of the death
sentence.
63
Such an interpretation of the evidence that justifies a finding that a
murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" seems irreconcilable
with an analysis of Godfrey and with the Supreme Court's express indication
that, where the victim dies instantly without prior physical abuse, the scene
resulting from the murder is "constitutionally irrelevant"" for purposes of
11 Id. at 282 n.l.
11 Id. at 275.
11 Id. at 278.
" According to appellate briefs filed by both parties, a medical examiner testified for the
state that Mrs. Ashmore died of strangulation on March 17, approximately two hours after hav-
ing eaten (the appointment with the unknown businessman had been at 1:00 p.m., March 17).
Brief for Appellant at 12; Brief for Appellee at 11.
10 612 P.2d 269, 279 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
61 Id. at 280.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 283 (emphasis added).
1 446 U.S. 420, 433 n.16 (1980).
1981]
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determining whether the murder was in fact "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman...."65
Furthermore, the facts in Chaney indicate only that the murder victim
was strangled on the same day that she was abducted. Any argument that the
victim's mental suffering during the interim between the kidnapping and the
actual killing made the murder "outrageously wicked and vile" 6 also seems
to be foreclosed by the opinion in Godfrey. The emphasis the Supreme Court
has placed on physical harm prior to death is such that an instantaneous
death without prior abuse is no more outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible,
or inhuman. than any other murder. 7
Eddings v. State
Eddings v. State6" provides an even closer factual comparison to God-
frey. On April 4, 1977, Monty Lee Eddings, a runaway juvenile from
Missouri, was driving a stolen vehicle carrying four passengers along the
Turner Turnpike when Highway Patrolman Larry Crabtree pulled up behind
and turned on his cruiser's red light. Eddings pulled off the road, the
patrolman got out of his cruiser, and when the patrolman was within about
six feet of the Eddings vehicle, Eddings stuck a sawed-off .410 shotgun out
the window and fired, killing Trooper Crabtree. 69
After the state's motion to have Eddings certified to stand trial as an
adult was granted and affirmed,70 Eddings pleaded nolo contendere to a
charge of first degree murder. 1 All three of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the state in its bill of particulars were found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt by the trial court: (1) that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) that the murder was committed for the pur-
pose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; (3) that the
defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society.2
In response to the defendant's claim on appeal that all murders are
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," the Court of Criminal Appeals
looked to the Florida definition of the same terminology."3 The court then
looked to the state's position regarding this particular aggravating cir-
cumstance--"that the identity of the victim and the manner in which the kill-
ing was done make this murder especially abhorrent."74
67 Id. at 432.
See trial court's definition of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," text accom-
panying note 63, supra.
67 446 U.S. 420, 428, 429 (1980). See also dissent by White and Rehnquist, id. at 450-51,
arguing for precisely this line of reasoning ("mental suffering" of Godfrey's mother-in-law dur-
ing the interim between her daughter's death and her own should not be ruled out as "torture").
63 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
69 Id.
7o In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okla. Cr.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 921 (1978).
" 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
72 Id. at 1167.
13 Id. at 1167-68. See also text accompanying notes 32-34, supra.




The distinguishing fact surrounding this murder, the Court of Criminal
Appeals found, was that the victim had not been prepared for danger in this
particular situation-"Indeed, he had no reason to expect it.""
The problem with such reasoning, of course, is that the same argument
could have applied factually to Godfrey; in the instant before Godfrey aimed
his shotgun through the window of his mother-in-law's trailer to shoot his
wife, "he observed his wife, his mother-in-law, and his 11-year-old daughter
playing a card game." '76 A moment later, Godfrey had killed his wife, and
after a lapse of time only long enough to enter the trailer, he had also killed
his mother-in-law." As in Eddings, therefore, the manner of death was a
fatal shotgun blast that came without warning.
Perhaps significantly, the Oklahoma court seemed to rely more heavily
on the state's first justification for applying section 701.12(4)-that the iden-
tity of the victim made the murder especially abhorrent. The court conclud-
ed: "We believe this killing of a police officer in the performance of his
duties was, in the words of the Florida Court, 'extremely wicked' and 'shock-
ingly evil,' and 'outrageously wicked and vile.' "7 In a footnote to this state-
ment, the court noted that the statutes of three states, Texas, Florida, and
Georgia, do provide that the killing of a law enforcement officer under such
circumstances is in itself an aggravating circumstance." 9 Simultaneously, the
court concluded that the evidence regarding the manner in which the defen-
dant committed the crime was indeed "designed to inflict a high degree of
pain with utter indifference to ... the suffering of others," in the words of
the Florida Supreme Court.8
In creating such a dichotomy between the identity of the victim and the
manner of death, the court seems to have indicated that manner of death,
much less physical abuse of the victim prior to that death, is not to be the
sole test for determining whether a murder was in fact "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel." Rather, in Eddings, the identity of the victim seems to
be the controlling factor. In effect, the court has apparently legislated a new
aggravating circumstance: All murders will be especially heinous, atrocious,
and cruel when the victim is a police officer who was murdered while in the
performance of official duties.
Limitations on an Application of Godfrey
There exists a significant difference in comparing factual situations in
which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found sufficient evidence to
justify a determination that a murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel to the guidelines issued in Godfrey v. Georgia. The difference is that no
$ Id.
7' 446 U.S. 420, 425 (1980).
7 Id.
" 616 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
, Id., n.3.
30 Id., quoting from State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).
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Oklahoma court has sentenced.a defendant to death based solely on the find-
ing of that aggravating circumstance." As specifically noted by the Supreme
Court in Godfrey, the defendant's sentences of death by the Georgia jury
were based entirely on subsection (b)(7). Accordingly, the Court gave "no
view as to whether or not the petitioner might constitutionally have received
the same sentences on some other basis." ' 82
Such a disclaimer as to the possibility that, under the same facts, a'
death sentence could be constitutionally imposed for other reasons does not
in any way vitiate the express decision that a reviewing court cannot be said
to have applied a constitutional construction of phrases such as "outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" when used to describe
murders resulting in instantaneous death unaccompanied by prior physical
abuse of the victim. The question of the validity of death sentences imposed
by reason of an erroneous application of the aggravating circumstance that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, combined with the
finding of one or more other statutory aggravating circumstances, remains
open.
Simply to assert that because Oklahoma's statutes require the finding of
only one aggravating circumstance, 3 imposition of the death penalty can be
upheld under such circumstances is a dangerous generalization. Such an over-
simplification ignores the alternative provisions of the statute: "Unless at
least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances . . . is found or if it is
found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding
of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be im-
posed."" If the jury in such a multiple-circumstance case had not been per-
mitted to apply the fourth aggravating circumstance (that the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel) to facts which, under Godfrey, it is
clearly inapplicable, might that jury have found that the additional ag-
gravating circumstances were outweighed by mitigating factors?" Such a
possibility, although conjectural, should be considered when the validity of
imposing the ultimate penalty for a criminal offense is at stake.
A far more troubling problem lies in the Supreme Court's failure to
take the Godfrey guidelines to their ultimate conclusion-that such an aggra-
" See Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Cr. 1980); Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159
(Okla. Cr. 1980); Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Cr. 1980); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269
(Okla. Cr. 1980).
11 446 U.S. 420, 433 n.15 (1980).
13 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.11 (Supp. 1976).
Id. (emphasis added).
, The language of the statute refers in the singular to the outweighing of an aggravating
circumstance by one or more mitigating factors. This language apparently has not been con-
strued, but it is illogical to infer from it that if the jury has found more than one aggravating cir-
cumstance the finding of mitigating factors can never outweigh those aggravating circumstances.
Such an interpretation would result in a mandatory death penalty whenever more than one
aggravating circumstance is found. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),
wherein the Supreme Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes do not meet the




vating circumstance cannot constitutionally be applied at the trial level
without adequate instruction to jurors as to the application of the statute.
The Godfrey plurality did sternly comment that the Georgia trial court's
instructions to the jury gave no guidance concerning the meaning of subsec-
tion (b)(7) and that, therefore, "the jury's interpretation of section (b)(7) can
only be the subject of sheer speculation." 8 The ultimate blame, however,
was repeatedly placed upon the Georgia Supreme Court for its failure to
apply clear reviewing standards for distinguishing this case, in which the
death penalty was imposed, from other cases, in which it was not." As
Justice Marshall noted in a concurring opinion, "[I]t is not enough for a
reviewing court to apply a narrowing construction to otherwise ambiguous
statutory language. The jury must be instructed on the proper, narrow con-
struction of the statute." 88
Conclusion
Although the statutory language of the aggravating circumstance at
issue in Godfrey and its Oklahoma counterpart differ, the definitions both
states have applied to the respective statutes indicate that they are clearly
parallel. The similar fact situations in Godfrey, Chaney, and Eddings
strengthen this conclusion in light of the similarity between the Georgia deci-
sion overturned by the Supreme Court in Godfrey and the Oklahoma court's
recent decisions in Chaney and Eddings. For those reasons, the Supreme
Court's decision in Godfrey is significant for Oklahoma.
If it is clear that Oklahoma has not correctly applied its fourth
statutory aggravating circumstance (that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel), however, the effect on Oklahoma's recent death penalty
cases is most unclear. The Godfrey decision is expressly limited to the par-
ticular fact that the Georgia jury that convicted Godfrey found no other ag-
gravating factors justifying imposition of the death penalty. In all of the
Oklahoma cases to date, however, the fourth statutory circumstance was one
of multiple aggravating factors found to exist. Nevertheless, it should not be
lightly assumed that a jury would have imposed the death penalty based only
on other aggravating factors found in a particular case.
In light of that problem, steps must be taken to insure that the decision
to impose a death sentence is not influenced by erroneous application of sec-
tion 701.12(4). First, the state's bill of particulars should include this ag-
gravating circumstance only when the facts of a particular case indicate that
it is applicable in light of Godfrey. Second, the jury should be given clear in-
structions regarding the fact situations to which that aggravating factor is ap-
plicable. As to both, the appropriate fact situations should be those in which
there is evidence that the victim was physically abused prior to death.
Bobbie Thomas Shell
" 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980).
, Id. at 427-33.
" Id. at 436-37.
19811
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
